

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 073798

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PARM, CCD, FRG

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SUBJECT: US-FRG BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL:
CTB, CW, MDW, SSOD

1. ON MARCH 18 US AND FRG REPS CONDUCTED BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB), CHEMICAL
WEAPONS (CW), MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW), AND UNGA
SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). US PARTICIPANTS

WERE LED BY ACDA ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR SLOSS; FRG PARTICIPANTS WERE LED BY ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH.

2. CTB. THE US SIDE STATED THAT A CTB WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN DETERRING PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, SINCE IT WOULD APPLY TO ON BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN ARSENALS, WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE DETERRENT VALUE OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCES. THE SECRETARY WILL BE DISCUSSING A CTB DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT; IF THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THEIR INSISTENCE THAT ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES MUST PARTICIPATE, WE WILL KNOW THAT THEY ARE NOT READY FOR REAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT INVOLVE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN A JOINT DRAFT TREATY. AFTERWARDS WE WOULD EXPECT MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CCD.

3. THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES), THE US SIDE INDICATED, WOULD BE ONE OF THE MAJOR ISSUES IN DEVELOPING A CTB TREATY. OUR CURRENT VIEW IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE A COMPLETE BAN ON PNES IN THE CONTEXT OF A CTB, SINCE WE KNOW OF NO WAY OF PREVENTING A PNE FROM PROVIDING WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION. IF THE PNE DEVICE WERE PROVIDED BY A NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTY, AT A MINIMUM THE PROVIDER WOULD GAIN INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF THE DEVICE. IF THE PNE DEVICE WERE FURNISHED BY A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTY, EVEN THOUGH SOME INTERNATIONAL BODY SUPERVISED THE EXPLOSION STILL THE PROVIDER WOULD GAIN INFORMATION DIRECTLY APPLICABLE

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TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD NOT OTHERWISE BE POSSIBLE UNDER A CTB REGIME.

4. THE FRG SIDE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT A CTB COULD BE CONCLUDED RAPIDLY, MAKING ONLY GUARDED REMARKS IN REGARD TO PNE'S. THE FRG REP DECLARED THAT "THERE IS LOGIC TO THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF PNE'S, BUT WE SEE THE US PROBLEM WITH IT." IN ADDITION, HE INQUIRED ABOUT US PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET VIEWS ON PNE'S, TO WHICH WE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE SOME TENTATIVE SIGNS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE CHANGES, BUT NO DEFINITE INDICATIONS. IF PNE'S WERE BANNED PURSUANT TO A CTB, THE FRG REP STATED, "ONE WOULD THEN HAVE TO LOOK AT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, TO SEE THAT BOTH TREATIES CORRESPOND." (COMMENT: ARTICLE V OF THE NPT REQUIRES THAT ANY POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS. THE QUESTION MIGHT THEREFORE

BE RAISED BY SOME STATES WHETHER A BAN ON PNE'S WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH NPT ARTICLE V, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT REGARD THE TWO AS INCONSISTENT.)

5. CW. IN VIEW OF THE UPCOMING CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, THE FRG SIDE ASKED ONLY FOR A SHORT SUMMARY OF WHAT THE US INTENDED TO DISCUSS. WE STATED WE WOULD PROVIDE AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON FOREIGN CW CAPABILITIES, AND WOULD DISCUSS THE PROS AND CONS OF THE VARIOUS MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS. THE FRG EXPRESSED INTEREST IN NATO DISCUSSIONS OF CW ISSUES (DURING THE APRIL MEETING OF THE NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS), AND DECLARED THAT CW VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE BECAUSE, BASED ON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE MATERIAL, IT IS "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DO ANYTHING WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION."

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6. MDW. WE EXPRESSED OUR CONTINUED DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BAN NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BASED ON ITS CONCEPTUAL VAGUENESS AND ON THE PROBLEM OF DESIGNING AN UMBRELLA AGREEMENT TO COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES. THE FRG REP USED THE MDW DISCUSSION AS A VEHICLE FOR SUGGESTING A WESTERN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL THINKING, KEYED TO SOVIET MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING SUCH PROPOSALS AS MDW, NON-USE OF FORCE, AND NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH CONSULTATIONS MIGHT LEAD TO DEVELOPING A WESTERN POLITICAL STRATEGY.

7. THE FRG REP STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD LIKE TO SEPARATE THE POLITICAL COMPETITION IN THE WORLD FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF WARFARE" AND THAT "BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA SMOKESCREEN THERE MUST BE A GENERAL ARMS CONTROL INTEREST." WE WERE MILDLY POSITIVE IN REGARD TO THE FRG SUGGESTION, SAYING THAT THIS MIGHT BE A WAY OF ENHANCING WESTERN CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL.

8. SSOD. THE DISCUSSIONS INDICATED SUBSTANTIAL US/FRG AGREEMENT ON ADOPTING A CAUTIOUSLY POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, SCHEDULED FOR MAY-JUNE 1978. THE U.S. SIDE NOTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASSURANCE OF A STRONG AND POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SSOD, WHICH IS MORE AFFIRMATIVE THAN THE FRG'S DAMAGE-LIMITING APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THE FRG MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE WILLING TO GRANT THE SSOD A "SEAL OF APPROVAL" ROLE IN REGARD TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES NEGOTIATED IN THE INTERIM. THE US IS NOT NEGATIVE TO

THE IDEA OF SSOD CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES,
BUT, WITH THE SESSION A YEAR AWAY AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS STILL UNCLEAR, THE US IS
CURRENTLY WARY OF COMMITTING ITSELF TO DISCUSSING
SPECIFIC TOPICS. BOTH THE US AND THE FRG AGREED ON THE
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DESIRABILITY OF BEGINNING A PROCESS OF THOROUGH
CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. THERE ALSO WAS APPARENT AGREEMENT
ON THE DESIRABILITY OF ENCOURAGING THE NON-ALIGNED TO
CONTINUE THEIR COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SPECIAL
SESSION. THE US NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE 7TH
SPECIAL SESSION WAS REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN NORTH/
SOUTH ECONOMIC MATTERS BECAUSE OF SUCH COOPERATION.
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